This paper studies the dispute resolution process with special emphasis on the dynamic patterns of litigation and settlement as well as the legal costs incurred and associated payments. I propose a dynamic bargaining model of dispute resolution with learning, estimate the model using micro data on medical malpractice disputes, and use the estimated model to assess the impact of proposed tort reforms. In my model the plainti¤ and the defendant do not have a common prior on the probability of winning court judgment and learning takes place as they bargain. Estimation results show that the model …ts all aspects of the data well. By conducting policy experiments using the estimated model, I …nd that capping jury awards or eliminating the contingency-fee arrangement signi…cantly shortens the expected time to resolution and lowers the expected total legal costs. On the other hand, loser-pay-all allocation of legal fees delay resolution and increase costs.
Introduction
In recent years, medical malpractice litigation has been at the forefront of the public policy debate in the United States. The annual cost of payments to medical malpractice claims, which includes both legal fees and compensation payments, was about $24 billion in 2002 and has doubled in the past 12 years (Tillinghast Towers- Perrin, 2003) . A commonly held opinion is that the high cost of medical malpractice litigation has contributed to rising health care costs (see e.g. U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2003). 1 Lengthy legal procedures and high legal costs are among the main drawbacks of the current litigation system. 2 In response to these problems, medical liability reforms, such as caps on jury awards or restrictions on lawyer fees, were adopted in many states during the 1990s and are currently under consideration at the federal level. 3 This paper studies the process through which medical malpractice disputes are resolved. Special emphasis is given to the timing and the terms of dispute resolutions and the legal costs incurred by the negotiating parties. I propose a dynamic bargaining model of dispute resolution with learning, estimate the model using micro data on medical malpractice litigation, and use the estimated model to assess the impact of proposed tort reforms.
In the United States, doctors are liable for the damages caused by negligent care. Upon the alleged occurrence of such damage, the patient's claim against the doctor 1 Medical malpractice litigation may also a¤ect health care costs indirectly, through "defensive medicine"aimed at preventing litigation (Kessler and McClellan, 1996) . Although this paper focuses on the direct cost of litigation, I discuss the issue of "defensive medicine" in Section 6 below. 2 For example, Senator Joseph Leiberman argues in his speech during a Senate debate on March 21, 1996 (quoted by Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999) "Everybody in America knows, at least most everybody know, that our Civil Justice System is not working well. We do not think anybody really can stand up and defend the status quo of the litigation system in America. The average person on the street -we stop them in Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport -knows that lawsuits take too long; that people do not get justice in a timely fashion; that too much money goes to lawyers." initiates a medical malpractice dispute. In this legal procedure, the plainti¤ (i.e., the patient) and the defendant (i.e., the doctor) engage in negotiations over the terms of settlement in the shadow of court judgment. If the plainti¤ …les a lawsuit and the parties do not reach an agreement, they will face a judgment by the court, which determines whether the defendant is liable and, if so, the award to the plainti¤.
To study this process, I propose a dynamic model in which, following the occurrence of an alleged instance of medical malpractice, the plainti¤ and the defendant bargain over a settlement. At any time during the negotiation, as long as no agreement has been reached, the plainti¤ has the option of …ling a lawsuit that would initiate the litigation phase. If no agreement is reached during the litigation phase, the case is resolved in court, where a jury verdict determines whether the defendant is liable and, if so the award to the plainti¤. In any period prior to the termination of a dispute, the defendant must pay his legal cost which I allow to di¤er depending on whether or not the plainti¤ has …led a lawsuit. In particular, the defendant's legal costs are typically higher during the litigation phase, which entails additional legal procedures with respect to the pre-litigation phase. On the other hand, the plainti¤'s legal costs are a …xed fraction of the compensation payment and are paid upon resolution of the dispute (the so-called "contingency fee rule").
In this study, I assume that the plainti¤ and the defendant do not have a common prior belief over the probability of prevailing at trial. This asymmetry in initial beliefs may be due, for example, to di¤erences in each party's perception of the relative ability of his or her lawyer, or to di¤erences in opinion about the predisposition of potential juries. This assumption generates the possibility that parties may fail to reach an agreement over the terms of a settlement. As new information is revealed during bargaining, learning takes place, and the negotiating parties update their expectations of obtaining a favorable verdict. I allow the rate of arrival of information to di¤er in the pre-litigation and the litigation phases, because of, for example, the "discovery process" which follows the …ling of a lawsuit. Learning has the e¤ect of drawing the plainti¤ and defendant's expectations of the trial results closer to each other, which in turn increases the probability of agreement.
I characterize the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this dynamic bargaining game. Equilibrium outcomes specify (i) the plainti¤'s decision of whether to …le a lawsuit and (ii) if so the time to …ling, (iii) whether or not the case is settled out of court, (iv) the time to resolution, (v) the legal costs incurred, and (vi) the terms of settlement. Delaying agreement is costly because of the per-period lawyer fees. However, the possibility of learning new information makes delay valuable for both players. This fundamental trade-o¤ plays an important role in the equilibrium characterization and is a key determinant of the time to …ling and the time to settlement. I …nd that the higher the rate at which new information arrives in bargaining, the shorter the time to settlement and the lower the legal costs. Furthermore, lower expected jury awards and less optimistic initial beliefs shorten settlement. I estimate the model using a unique data set on individual medical malpractice disputes. The data set contains detailed information on the time, mode, cost, and terms of settlement as well as the time of …ling lawsuit (if a lawsuit is …led) for all medical malpractice disputes in Florida over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . The model …ts all aspects of the data well. I …nd that learning plays a quantitatively important role in explaining the dynamic patterns of litigation and settlement observed in the data.
I use the estimated structural model to conduct policy experiments and evaluate the e¤ects of proposed reforms of the medical liability system. I …nd that capping jury awards or eliminating the contingency fee rule signi…cantly shortens the expected time to resolution and lowers the expected total legal costs. Because shorter legal procedures would reduce congestion in the legal system and savings of legal costs would lower the deadweight loss of litigation, I conclude that these reforms could have important welfare implications. On the other hand, replacing the current system with the "loser-pay-all"allocation of legal fees would not be a desirable policy, since it would delay resolution and increase costs.
There is a large theoretical literature on bargaining models of dispute resolution (see, e.g., the survey by Spier, 2005) . A signi…cant fraction of the literature considers models similar to the one I propose in this paper, in which the negotiating parties do not have a common prior belief over the probability of prevailing at trial (e.g., Landes, 1971; Posner, 1973; Priest and Klein, 1984; and Wittman 1988) . 4 The main focus of these studies, however, is to analyze the parties'decision of whether or not to settle their dispute out of court. For this reason, existing contributions consider only two-period bargaining models, in which failure to reach an agreement in the …rst period leads to a jury verdict in the second period. As indicated above, one of the main goals of my paper is to study the timing of …ling and settlement decisions in legal disputes. I therefore consider a dynamic bargaining model. 5 As illustrated by Yildiz (2003) in the context of a "divide-the-dollar"game, simple extensions of bargaining models without a common prior to an n-period environment may not be able to explain the occurrence of delay. Within the context of bargaining models of dispute resolution, this implies that either the parties would settle immediately or that the case would be resolved by court judgement. By introducing learning in a dynamic bargaining model without a common prior, I show that delayed settlement can occur in equilibrium. 6 Also, by making the plainti¤'s decision to …le lawsuit endogenous, I show that delays in …ling can emerge in equilibrium.
Corresponding to the theoretical literature summarized above, the main focus of the empirical literature on dispute resolution to date has been the estimation of the probability of defendants prevailing at trial and/or the probability of cases settling out of court. 7 The two papers that are most closely related to mine are Waldfogel (1995) and Sieg (2000) . Waldfogel (1995) uses data on the mode of resolution of civil disputes to estimate a two-period bargaining model with without a common prior. Using the same data set I use in this paper, Sieg (2000) estimates a two-period bargaining model with asymmetric information to study the mode, cost, and terms of settlement in medical malpractice disputes. Neither paper, however, studies the dynamic patterns of …ling and settlement in dispute resolution. 8 Another strain of empirical research explores the e¤ects of tort reforms. Yoon (2001) studies the e¤ect of a reform implemented in Alabama that imposed a cap on 5 Bebchuk (1996) considers an n-period barganinig model to explain why a plainti¤ may …le a lawsuit even though the expected value of litigation is negative. In his model, however, the players have identical expectations over the probability of prevailing at trial, and settlement always occurs in the initial period. Spier (1992) considers a dynamic bargaining model with asymmetric information, where in equilibrium the plainti¤ makes a sequence of "screening" o¤ers that only certain types of defendants accept, thus leading to the possibility of delay. Her analysis, however, abstracts from the plainti¤'s decisions of whether and when to …le a lawsuit. 6 Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994) introduce an interim stage of "discovery" in a two-period model to study the e¤ect of the discovery process. They show that it is possible for a case to settle in the discovery stage. However, their paper abstracts from the decision of …ling and is not interested in explaining the dynamic patterns of settlement and …ling. 7 See, e.g., Danzon and Lillard (1983), Farber and White (1991) , and the survey by Kessler and Rubinfeld (2004) . 8 There is a small empirical literature that uses duration analysis to estimate hazard models of dispute resolution. Kessler (1996) , for example, estimates a duration model to assess the e¤ect of institutional features of the legal system on the time to resolution of civil disputes (see, also Fournier and Zuehlke, 1996 and Fenn and Rickman, 1999) . These studies, however, are not interested in explaining the time to …ling, the terms of settlement, or the legal costs incurred by the negotiating parties. jury awards. He …nds that such a reform signi…cantly reduced average compensation payments. Using laboratory experiments, Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) …nd that caps on jury awards encourage settlement. Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995) study the e¤ect of a temporary implementation of the "loser-payall" rule for the allocation of legal fees in Florida and …nd that such rule increases settlement payments. The …ndings of my analysis are consistent with these results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the model and characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the econometric speci…cation. Section 5 contains the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, policy experiments are presented in Section 6.
Model
I consider a perfect-information sequential bargaining model of legal dispute resolution with stochastic learning. The players of the bargaining game are a plainti¤ (p) and a defendant (d). The plainti¤ and the defendant bargain over the compensation payment x 2 R + from the defendant to the plainti¤ to resolve the dispute. Each player i 2 fd; pg has linear von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over monetary transfer and legal costs. Both players know the amount of the potential jury award V 2 R + , but the outcome of the judgement is uncertain, i.e. the players do not know who will win the case in the even of a trial. 9 The defendant pays V to the plainti¤ if the plainti¤ wins the judgment, while the defendant does not pay any amount otherwise. I denote the plainti¤'s probability of prevailing by .
Timing and Phases
The bargaining game has two multi-period phases depending on whether the plainti¤ has …led a lawsuit or not: the pre-litigation phase (Phase O) and the litigation phase (Phase L). The game starts with Phase O at period t = 0: Players bargain every period until they reach an agreement. Phase O has a …nite number of periods T < 1, due to the statute of limitation at period t = T + 1 < 1, after which the plainti¤'s claim to recover is barred by law. The plainti¤ has an The plainti¤'s endogenous decision to …le a lawsuit initiates Phase L. Let t L 2 f0; :::; T g denote the date of the …ling of lawsuit. Once the plainti¤ …les a lawsuit, the case is processed in court towards the judgment scheduled T + 1 periods after the date of …ling, that is date t = t L + T + 1 < 1 . While the case is processed in court, the players can always agree to settle the case until t = t L + T: Failure to reach a settlement agreement by t = t L + T results in the resolution by the court judgment at t = t L + T + 1.
Stage Games In Phase O, players play the following stage game in every period t 2 f0; :::; T g. At the beginning of each period, information arrives with probability Ot and does not arrive with probability 1 Ot . The information is such that it a¤ects the outcome of the judgment (e.g., the result of third-party medical examination) and is commonly observed by both players. Then, nature chooses the proposer, with probability for the plainti¤ and 1 for the defendant. The chosen party proposes the amount of compensation payment x, which will be either accepted or rejected by the other party. If accepted, the game concludes with the proposed amount of money x being transferred from the defendant to the plainti¤, and the dispute is resolved. If the proposal is rejected, the plainti¤ chooses whether or not to …le a lawsuit. The case moves to Phase L if the plainti¤ …les a lawsuit, while it remains in Phase O and the same stage game is repeated if the plainti¤ chooses not to …le. If the case is neither …led nor settled during the T periods, the statute of limitation renders the claim by the plainti¤ to be ine¤ective.
After the plainti¤ …les a lawsuit, the parties play the following stage game in every period t 2 ft L ; :::; t L + T g until the court judges on the case at t = t L + T + 1. At the beginning of each period, information that a¤ects the outcome of the judgment arrives with probability Lt and does not arrive with probability 1
Lt . Then, nature again chooses the proposer, with probability for the plainti¤ and 1 for the defendant. The chosen party proposes the amount of compensation payment x, which will be either accepted or rejected by the other party. If accepted, the game terminates with the proposed amount of money being transferred from the defendant to the plainti¤, and the dispute is resolved. If rejected, the case remains in Phase L and the same stage game is repeated until t = t L + T:
I allow the rates of information arrival to di¤er across phases. One of the reasons for di¤ering rates stems from the "discovery process." In this process, both parties can employ a variety of legal devices to acquire information on the case that follows the …ling of a lawsuit.
In civil disputes, including medical malpractice disputes, plainti¤s' lawyers use a contingency fee arrangement 10 , while defendants' legal councils charge an hourly legal fee. The contingency fee arrangement entitles the plainti¤'s lawyers to a fraction (typically one-third to 40%) of the money received from the defendant only if a positive payment is received. Because of this deferment, the plainti¤ incurs no additional legal cost by delaying agreement. Hence, plainti¤s's objective is to maximize the expected payment from the defendant. While delaying settlement may not a¤ect the plainti¤'s legal costs, it leads to higher legal costs for the defendant. For the defendant, I assume per-period legal costs of
and L respectively. I allow per-period costs to di¤er depending on whether or not the plainti¤ has …led a lawsuit. In particular, the defendant's legal costs are typically higher in the litigation phase, which entails additional legal procedures with respect to the pre-litigation phase. I consider a common time-discount factor denoted by 2 [0; 1].
Information and Beliefs
The model is a game of perfect information. As described above, the players can observe all the actions of the other player. The information revealed is also commonly observed by both players. Hence, there is no asymmetric information. The players, however, do not have a common prior over the probability that the plainti¤ will win the case ( ). This asymmetry in initial beliefs may be due for example to di¤erences in each party's perception of the relative ability of his or her lawyer, to di¤erence in legal standards expected to be applied to the case bu the judges, to di¤erences in opinion about the predisposition of potential juries. 
At the beginning of each period t in Phase J 2 fO; Lg, information related to winning probability (such as the result of a third party medical examination or testimony by an expert witness) arrives with probability J . I denote an arrival of information at t by n t 2 f0; 1g, where n t = 1 means arrival of information while n t = 0 represents no arrival. The cumulated amount of information at period t is denoted by n t 2 f0; :::; tg, and therefore
Information is either in favor of or against the plainti¤. I denote the content of the arrived information n t by m t 2 f0; 1g: The content is for the plainti¤ if m t = 1;while m t = 0 means the arrived information is against the plainti¤, and
with probability 1 with probability ;
where is not known to the players. The cumulated information in favor of the plainti¤ is denoted by m t 2 f0; :::; n t g, leading to
where m t is multiplied by n t since the content of information matters only if information arrives. Players update their beliefs according to Bayesian updating as follows: The beliefs at period t, denoted by b
p +n t m t ) and Beta( d +m t ; d + n t m t ) respectively. Hence, at period t; the expectations on the probability of plainti¤'s prevailing on the judgement are
The players use these expectations as their estimates of . The …rmer the beliefs (i.e., the higher the …rmness of belief parameter ), the less is the impact of the information obtained in the legal process. By modelling beliefs this way, I can capture the relative impact of new learning on prior beliefs. The information environment I have described above is common knowledge to both players. For notational convenience, I let k t = (n t ; m t ) 2 f0; tg f0; tg denote the information state.
Equilibrium Characterization
The model is a dynamic game with perfect information. Thus, I employ subgameperfect equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. Because the model has a …nite number of periods, backward induction provides us with a characterization of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. I start the analysis from the last stage in Phase L, and move to Phase O.
Equilibrium without Learning
In order to clarify the role of learning in the model, I …rst characterize the equilibrium for the case in which there is no learning.
Proposition 1 If no learning takes place (b
, the players either settle immediately or the case is resolved by court judgement. Players settle immediately i¤
and the case is resolved by the court judgment otherwise. The case is …led immediately if it is not settled immediately.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that delays in settlement and …ling cannot occur if there is no learning. The parties settle immediately if their beliefs are su¢ ciently close, but if their beliefs di¤er signi…cantly, they do not settle, and the case is resolved by court judgment. The threshold condition can be interpreted intuitively. The left hand side of inequality (1) is the discounted di¤erence in expected award, and the right hand side represents the discounted sum of legal costs to be saved. If the total legal cost to be saved is large enough compared to the di¤erence in expected award, the players settle immediately. The discounting in (1) is up to t = T to re ‡ect the fact that the plainti¤ will choose to …le immediately if he does not settle immediately, because the award is discounted more if he …les later.
This result clari…es the limitation of the existing models of dispute resolution without a common prior (e.g., Landes, 1971; Posner, 1973; Priest and Klein, 1984; and Wittman 1988) . In such models, learning in the legal procedure is not considered, and the divergence of the beliefs is the sole reason for not agreeing immediately if legal cost is signi…cantly learge. If players do not agree immediately, the players will choose to …le and face judgement rather than to settle after certain periods. However, this proposition shows that the divergence of expectation alone is not adequate to explain dynamic patterns of delayed settlements and …ling which are typically observed in the data. 13 In the rest of the section, I consider the case with learning in which the delayed settlement and litigation occurs in equilibrium.
Phase L (Litigation Phase)
I start my analysis from Phase L following backward induction. Recall that a Phase L subgame is reached only if the case is litigated at some period during Phase O. Let t L 2 f0; :::; T g denote the date of …ling the lawsuit. If the players cannot settle by date t L + T , the judgement by the court at t = t L + T + 1 determines the outcome of the last stage. Let V i t t L (k t ) denote the continuation value for player i 2 fp; dg at the beginning of date t in Phase L with information state k t . Note that the subscript is t t L , which is the number of periods in Phase L. Thus, the continuation value of the judgment is
if the plainti¤ prevails otherwise.
I obtain V i t t L (k t ) by applying backward induction and having (2) as …nal values. To do so, I consider two separate cases depending on whether the players will settle or continue.
First, consider the case of
Suppose that the players settle in period t with monetary transfer x t . The plainti¤ agrees only if
This contradicts with
which proves that the players will not settle at t. Hence, the continuation value of each players at the beginning of date t will be
Now, consider the case of
in which players settle. Both players accept an o¤er if it gives them at least their continuation value. If the plainti¤ is recognized as a proposer, she chooses to o¤er
; the defendant's continuation value. This is because the plainti¤'s settlement o¤er is larger than her continuation value, i.e.,
. I can apply the same argument for the cases in which the defendant is the proposer. Thus, in equilibrium, the proposer o¤ers the continuation value of the opponent, and the opponent accepts. The continuation value of each player at the beginning of date t is written as
Combining both cases, the argument presented above proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2 1. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the payo¤ of the players at t 2 ft L + 1; :::
2. Given k t and t L , players settle at t 2 ft L + 1; :::
3. Given that players settle at t 2 ft L + 1; :::; t L + T g in Phase L, the payment is
if the plainti¤ is a proposer if the defendant is a proposer, and the total legal cost incurred is
This proposition characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase L: Note that the identity of the proposer does not a¤ect the settlement decision though it a¤ects the compensation payment. This arises because the players choose to settle if the joint surplus of settling today is larger than the joint surplus of continuing the case. The compensation payment depends on the identity of the proposer because the recognized proposer obtains all of the surplus. Though the plainti¤ incurs no per-period legal cost, delaying agreement is still costly for him because he misses the bene…ts of the saving of the defendant's legal costs that indirectly increases compensation payment. Therefore, delaying agreement is costly for both players, and quick settlement is preferable. However, the possibility of learning new information makes delay valuable, since this information enhances the probability of a settlement, which in turn generates positive surplus for both players. This fundamental trade-o¤ plays an important role in the equilibrium characterization and is a key determinant of the timing of settlement.
Phase O (Pre-Litigation Phase)
Let W i t (k t ) denote the continuation value for player i 2 fp; dg at the beginning of date t in Phase O with information state k t . Again, I start from the last stage of Phase O subgame. The maximum number of periods in Phase O is T ; after which the claim by the plainti¤ loses its value due to the statute of limitation. Hence, each player has continuation payo¤ of 0 at date T + 1, i.e.,
I compute W i t (k t ) by applying backward induction and having (3) as …nal values. In Phase O, the plainti¤ has an option of litigating a case at any date t 2 f0; :::; T g. Solving the value function in Proposition 2 up to the …rst period in Phase L, I can obtain the continuation value of the Phase L subgame, V i 1 (k t ). Note that this continuation value does not depend on the date of litigation t L itself but does depend on the information state k t at period t.
The plainti¤ will choose to litigate at the end of date t if and only if
Hence, the continuation value for the plainti¤ at the end of date t is written as
while the continuation value for the defendant depends on the litigation decision by the plainti¤ and is written as
Now, I repeat an argument similar to that of the Phase L regarding settlement decision. I consider two separate cases depending on whether the players will settle or continue the case.
First, consider the case of 
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 3
1. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, the payo¤s of the players at t 2 f0; :::; T g in Phase O are expressed as
2. Given k t , players settle at t 2 f0; :::; T g in Phase O i¤
3. Given k t , the plainti¤ litigates at t 2 f0; :::; T g in Phase O i¤
4. Given that players settle at t 2 f0; :::; T g in Phase O, the payment is
if the plainti¤ is a proposer if the defendant is a proposer, and the total legal cost incurred is t S C O :
This proposition characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase O: The mechanics of the settlement decision are exactly the same as for the characterization for Phase L. The only di¤erence is that the cost of delay and the possibility of learning in the next period depend on the plainti¤'s decision to …le or not at the end of each period.
The decision to …le a lawsuit by the plainti¤ is also derived from a trade-o¤ between the cost of delay and the possibility of learning. The cost of delaying …ling has two components. One is the per-period legal cost of the pre-litigation phase, because the total length of the underlying game becomes one period longer if …ling is delayed by one period. Even though the plainti¤ incurs no legal cost per period, this delay still impacts him because minimizing the defendant's legal cost may result in a higher compensation payment to the plainti¤. The second component is the cost of delay due to discounting. The plainti¤ prefers to obtain the continuation value of the Phase L subgame earlier, since a one-period delay in …ling costs him (1 )V p 1 ( ) when no information arrives. The bene…t of delaying …ling by one period is that the parties have one more period to obtain new information and hence reach an agreement. Thus, the plainti¤ prefers to stay in Phase O longer if C O is small and is large, while low Ot provides an incentive for the plainti¤ to …le early.
Data
In Florida, a statute on professional liability claims requires medical malpractice insurers to …le a report on all of their closed claims once the claim is resolved regardless of their outcomes. The reports are collected by the Florida Department of Financial Services, the insurance regulator of the Florida state government. The report contains detailed information on the dispute resolution process, as well as individual case characteristics. The information on the dispute resolution process includes important dates (calender date of occurrence, initial claim, …ling of lawsuit, resolution either by settlement or by court judgement), settlement payments (or award by the court in case of resolution by court judgment), and total legal costs incurred by the defendants. The information on case characteristics includes patient characteristics (e.g. age and sex), defendant characteristics (e.g. defendant type, specialty, and insurance policy), and the characteristics of injury (e.g. severity and place of occurrence). Hence, this data set contains detailed information on all the variables of interest, i.e., if and when a lawsuit is …led, whether or not the case is settled out of court, the time to resolution, the legal costs incurred and the terms of settlement.
My sample of observations consists of 3,845 claims against physicians 14 which were resolved between October 1985 and July 1999. 15 Following Sieg (2000), I restrict attention to cases with the defendant's legal cost exceeding $1,000 and which were 14 Claims against hospitals, HMOs, dentists, ambulance surgical centers, and crisis stabilization units are excluded from my sample to control for the heterogeneity of the plainti¤. 15 During this period, there were no major changes in state law pretaining to resolution of medical malpractice disputes. 16 Because the timing and disposition of cases di¤er greatly depending on the severity of the injury, I restrict attention to the cases in which injuries resulted in permanent major damage or death of the patient. Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics of all the variables I use for estimation. In my data, 87.4% of the cases were settled by parties rather than facing judgment by the court. These cases were settled either after …ling a lawsuit (75.3%) or without …ling a lawsuit (12.3%). Only 12.6% of all the cases were resolved by a court judgment. Where this happened, the defendants were three times more likely to win the judgment (i.e., award was zero). Mean compensation payments were similar for the cases that were settled after …ling a lawsuit and those that were settled without …ling a lawsuit (around $300,000).
Number of Observations
Legal costs for defendants substantially di¤ered across modes of resolution. Defense lawyers usually charge based on the amount of time they spent. It is not surprising to …nd that the mean of the defense legal costs correlates strongly with the mean time to resolution as displayed in Table 2 . Mean of defence legal costs for cases settled without a lawsuit is about one-…fth of the cases settled after a lawsuit. This Numbers are in quarters of a year. The numbers in parentheses provide standard deviations. Table 2 . The cases settled after …ling a lawsuit have a signi…cantly higher mean cost ($53,989) compared to the settled cases without a lawsuit ($9,047). Among the cases resolved by court judgement, mean defense costs are more than 50% higher for the cases won by the plainti¤s than the cases won by the defendants, which again corresponds to the longer time to resolution. Mean time to …ling a lawsuit, which corresponds to the periods spent in the prelitigation phase, is similar for the settled cases and cases resolved by court judgment. The time to resolution di¤er between the cases settled after …ling and the cases resolved by the judgment. This di¤erence results from the di¤erence in time to resolution after …ling lawsuit. The cases settled without a lawsuit, which correspond to settlement in pre-litigation phase, spend longer periods in the pre-litigation phase than the …led cases on average.
Figures 2 o¤ers more a detailed description of statistics on the time to …ling and the time to settlement in pre-litigation phase. Figure 2 provides the histogram of …ling and settlement without lawsuit. Note that the sum of the fractions for …ling and settlement without lawsuit add up to one because each case is either …led or settled without lawsuit. In Florida, the statute of limitation regarding a medical malpractice Fraction of time to …ling a lawsuit and time to settle without a lawsuit add up to one. This is because cases are either 1) resolved after a lawsuit is …led or 2) settled without a lawsuit. The fraction of cases …ling lawsuits in pre-litigation phase and a fraction of cases settling without lawsuits have a common pattern. In both the hazard rate increases signi…cantly at the second quarter and gradually increases over time. Corresponding to a high hazard rate after the second quarter, the histogram re ‡ects that more than 35% of cases are …led in the second quarter before the fraction declines rapidly over time. Regarding the time to settlement without a lawsuit, the decline after the second quarter is much slower as a result of the lower hazard rate.
Figures 3 presents more details on the time to settlement after …ling a lawsuit. The hazard rate increases over time similar to the time to …ling and the time to settlement without a lawsuit. Ninety percent of cases are settled in 13 quarters, and less than 5% of cases are settled after 16 quarters.
Compensation payments have very high variance. Figure 4 presents the histogram of (log) compensation payments from the defendant to the plainti¤. Of the total cases, about 9% of them concluded with judgment in favor of the defendant and, thus, have zero payments. The amount of positive payments have very high variance, and the shape of the distribution is close to log-normal distribution. More than half of the cases are between $98,700 and $729,400. The distribution for the cases judged with positive award is also similar to the log-normal distribution, while the mean and variance are much larger. Similar to that of compensation payments, the distribution of legal costs is close to a log-normal distribution. As clearly seen from Figure 5 , the distribution of cost of the cases resolved by court judgment have much higher costs compared with the distribution of the other cases. The settled cases tend to have much lower costs compared to the cases resolved by court judgments.
Econometric Speci…cation
Becuase the model does not admit closed-form solution and state space is large, I will solve the model numerically for each parameter values. The numerical solution of the model provides conditional probabilities of equilibrium outcomes. Due to unobserved heterogeneity in several dimensions, I will simulate the model using Monte Carlo integration to obtain the conditional probabilities, which is used to calculate likelihood. I estimate the model by maximum likelihood.
Calculating Conditional Probabilities of Equilibrium Outcomes
In Chapter 2, I characterized the equilibrium outcome on the time, mode, cost, and terms of settlement, as well as the time of …ling a lawsuit (if a lawsuit is …led). However, the outcomes are contingent on the realization of the state of information k t = (n t ; m t ) 2 f0; :::; tg f0; :::; tg which is not observable to the econometrician. Thus, from the perspective of the econometrician, the litigation timing t L , the settlement timing t S , the compensation payment x, and the total legal cost C are all random variables because they depend on the (unobservable) realization of k t . Hence, I …rst compute the conditional probability of observing the realization of random variables t L ; t S ; x; C in order to compute the likelihood contribution of each observation.
Let
SL t (n t ; m t ), and d F I t (n t ; m t ) denote the indicator function respectively for settlement in Phase O, settlement in Phase L, and …ling of a lawsuit at period t. Using the results of Propositions 2 and 3, these indicator functions are written as
t (n t ; m t ) = 1 indicate settlement in Phase O and in Phase L, and litigation at period t given (n t ; m t ), (n t ; m t ; t L ), and (n t ; m t ) while 0 otherwise. We assume the rates of information arrival as Ot = O0 + t O1 and Lt = L0 + t L1 . Let q O t (n t ; m t ) denote the probability of being in state k t = (n t ; m t ) 2 f0; :::; tg f0; :::; tg in Phase O, and let q L t (n t ; m t ; t L ) denote the probability of being in state k t in Phase L given the litigation date of t L < t. I can compute q O t recursively as follows:
; which can be written as
I can compute q L t recursively for t > t L as follows:
Let l = fF ILE; N OF ILEg denote if a case is litigated (l = F ILE) or not (l = N OF ILE), and s 2 fSET T LE; JU DGEg denote if the case is settled (s = SET T LE) or reaches judgment by the court (s = JU DGE). A case is resolved either by settlement with lawsuit ((l; s) = (F ILE; SET T LE)), by settlement without lawsuit ((l; s) = ((N OF ILE; SET T LE)), or by judgement of the court ((l; s) = (F ILE; JU DGE)) on equilibrium path. With this notation, the probability that the econometrician observes litigation at date t L can be written as
is the indicator of …ling a lawsuit at t L given the state k t L . Settlement in Phase L occurs only after litigation in Phase O. Thus, the probability of settlement in Phase L conditional on litigation at Phase L is written as
where q L t S (n t S ; m t S ; t L ) is the probability of reaching state k t L = (n t L ; m t L ) in period t S given the case is litigated at t L and d SL t (n t S ; m t S ; t L ) is the indicator of settlement in period t S at state (n t S ; m t S ) given the case is litigated at t L : The probability of reaching judgment can be calculated similarly. If players do not settle for the whole period in Phase L between t L +1 and t L +T , the case reaches judgment (s = JU DGE) by the court. Hence, I can write the probability of reaching judgement as
In some cases, players may settle in Phase O and there will be no litigation. Thus,
Similarly, I can express the probability of payment to be in bin x k with settlements without lawsuit in Phase O as Pr(x 2 x k jt S ; SET T LE; ;; N OF ILE)
(n t S ; m t S )d p (n t S ; m t S ; x k ; t S ; ;; N OF ILE)
If a case reaches judgement, the identity of the proposer does not matter because there is no bargaining taking place. The defendant pays the amount the jury awards if he loses, and makes no payments otherwise. Hence, I can express the density of the payment in judgment as
Probabilities that the total defense cost C will fall into a bin C k can be computed similarly. For cases settled after …ling lawsuit, the probability of total defense cost falling into a bin C k is calculated as
while those for the cases settled without …ling can be written as Pr(C 2 C k jt S ; SET T LE; ;; N OF ILE)
Regarding the cases concluded by a court judgement, we can calculate it similarly as
This completes the computation of conditional probabilities.
Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in several dimensions. For instance, given two cases that are resolved by court judgment, the time to judgment T can signi…cantly di¤er across cases. For example, congestion in the legal system in a particular jurisdiction a¤ects the time to judgement T . Hence, I need to assume an unobserved heterogeneity on the exogenous parameter T . I assume T to follow a negative binomial distribution which is a ‡exi-ble distribution with discrete support. I denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of T by F T ( ) with parameters 0T and 1T :
The statute of limitation period T , which is also exogenous in the model, also di¤ers across cases though the statute of limitation date for medical malpractice litigation in Florida is set at 2 years. The legally determined statute of limitation period is not the actual length of time player can bargain without …ling a lawsuit. The statute of limitation is legally counted from the date of the occurrence of incident, but the bargaining does not necessarily begin on the date of occurrence. For example, a plainti¤ may begin bargaining 8 months after the occurrence of the incident, which leaves him 16 months before …ling if the legal length of the statute of limitation is 24 months. I assume T to follow a negative binomial distribution which is a ‡exible distribution with discrete support. I denote their CDFs by F T ( ) with parameters 0T and 1T :
Another factor that may di¤er from case to case is the probability of winning as well as the initial beliefs. Cases di¤er on the likelihood of plainti¤'s winning depending on many factors which are di¢ cult to observe in the data. Hence, I let the winning probability to di¤er from case to case, and draw it from a beta distribution F ( ) with parameters 1 and 2 :
Similarly, cases that are resolved by court judgment may also have very di¤erent potential jury awards V depending on the unobserved characteristics of the case, composition of the juries, and other factors. Hence, I consider unobserved heterogeneity in V: Potential jury awards V can also depend on some of the patient characteristics that is observable in the data such as the age of the patient. Thus, I will also consider V to depend on the age of the patient. I categorized patients'age into very young (before 22 years old, denoted as group 1), young (ages 23-44, denoted as group 2), middle (ages 45-65, denoted as group 3), and old (above 65 years old, denoted as group 4). I assume that for group i, V follows a log-normal distribution F V i ( ) with mean and variance denoted by V i and 2 V . Note that the computational time increase linearly with the number of the groups because the equilibrium have to be recalculated for di¤erent values of V i :
The per-period legal cost of the defendant also di¤ers across cases due to factors such as the law …rm the defendant employs or some unobserved characteristics. Given a case, however, the per-period legal cost after …ling a lawsuit is most likely to increase due to the increase in the hours worked by the lawyers to prepare more documentations. Hence, I reparametrize C L by a new parameter so that C L = (1+ )C O : Since the degree of the increase of the per-period legal cost depends on the characteristics of the case, as well as the law …rm employed for the case, I assume to have unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, I consider unobserved heterogeneity in both pre-litigation and litigation phase legal cost and assume them to follow log-normal distributions whose cumulative distribution functions are denoted by F C ( ) and F ( ); with parameters C ; 2 C , , 2 respectively. In addition to the per-period legal cost, I allow an extra cost C EXt for processing a case quickly. 18 The cost decreases over time and is written as C EXt = maxfC EX0 t C EX1 ; 0g, where C EX0 is drawn from a lognormal distribution, F C 0 ( );with parameters C 0 and 2 C 0 . For notational convenience, I denote the realization of unobserved heterogeneity by Z = fC O ; C EX ; ; ; V; T; T g: Estimation I use the equilibrium characterization derived by Propositions 1 and 2 to compute the likelihood contribution of each observation. Because I can compute the conditional probabilities of equilibrium decisions (as above), I can now construct the likelihood function. The contribution to the likelihood function of each observation in the sample is equal to the probability of observing the vector of endogenous events (x; t S ; t L ; s; l) given the vector of the parameters = f ; d ; p ; ; A ; B ; ; ; F T ; F T ; F ; F C ; F C 0 ; F ; fF V i g 4 i=1 g. Because I consider unobserved heterogeneity in Z = fC O ; C EX ; ; ; V; T; T g; I need to conduct a Monte Carlo integration over these variables Z in order to obtain the likelihood which can be written as L( jx; t S ; s; t; i) = Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Pr(x; C; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i)dF
where Pr(x; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i) is computed using the conditional probabilities computed above as follows. I use Monte Carlo integration to compute the integration.
(i) For the cases settled without …ling a lawsuit, Pr(x; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ) is obtained by
Pr(x; C; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i) = Pr(N OF ILEjZ; ; i)) Pr(t S jSET T LE; ;; N OF ILE; Z; ; i)
Pr(x 2 x k jt S ; SET T LE; ;; N OF ILE; Z; ; i) Pr(C 2 C k jt S ; SET T LE; ;; N OF ILE; Z; ; i):
(ii) For the cases settled after …ling a lawsuit, Pr(x; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i) is computed by
Pr(x; C; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i) = Pr(F ILEjZ; ; i)) Pr(t L jF ILE; Z; ; i) Pr(SET T LEjt L ; F ILE; Z; ; i)
Pr(t S jSET T LE; t L ; F ILE; Z; ; i)
Pr(x 2 x k jt S ; SET T LE; t L ; F ILE; Z; ; i)
while (iii) for the cases resolved by court judgment, I have
Pr(x; t S ; s; t L ; ljZ; ; i) = Pr(F ILEjZ; ; i) Pr(t L jF ILE; Z; ) Pr(JU DGEjt L ; F ILE; Z; ; i) Pr(t S jJU DGE; t L ; F ILE; Z; ; i)
Pr(x 2 x k jJU DGE; t L ; F ILE; Z; ; i)
For the cases resolved by court judgement, I do not condition x and C by t S because of computational limitation 19 . I take the log of above probability and sum them over all the elements in the sample to obtain the log-likelihood.
Results

Parameter Estimates
Estimates are presented in Table 3 . Di¤erence in beliefs is signi…cant at the initial stage. Mean of Plainti¤'s belief on probability of his winning is p = = 0:9566, while mean of defendant's belief on probability of plainti¤'s winning is d = = 0:2982. We can compare this to the estimated distribution of plainti¤'s winning rate, that is Unfortunately, the data for the cases resolved by judgment do not provide breakdown of economic and non-economic damages. Finally, the relative bargaining power between plainti¤ and defendant is caputred by . 22 The estimate of being 0.7757 implies that plainti¤ have much stronger bargaining power.
Model Fit
As a result of estimation, I …nd that the model …ts all aspect of the data well. I provide the …t of the model regarding the time to settlement and …ling, as well as the compensation payments for di¤erent modes of resolution. In Figures 6 and 7 , I present the …t of the model to the data on the time to settlement and …ling. The model replicates the dynamic patterns of …ling and settlement in pre-litigation very well as shown in Figure 6 . In particular, the model …ts the data on the time to …ling, which increase sharply in period 2 and decreases gradually, very well. Regarding settlement in the pre-litigation phase, the magnitude of the fraction is captured correctly. The model under-predicts by about 0.02 for the fraction in periods 3 and 4. Figure 7 shows the …t of the model on the time to settlement after …ling a lawsuit. The model captures the shape of the data, which increases for the …rst several period and then declines gradually. The di¤erence between the predicted fractions of cases settling and the data in the …rst three periods and the last several periods may result from the linearity assumption on the rate of arrival. This assumption may have prevented the model from capturing some factors in the data. Figures 8-10 present the …t of the model on the compensation payment. As shown in Figure 8 , the …t on payments for the cases resolved by court judgment shows the same pattern as observed in the data. Figure 9 provides the …t of the model with respect to compensation payment for the cases settled after …ling. The model replicates the shape of the data with …fth and sixth bins having the largest fractions. The …t of the highest three bins are precise though the …t for the rest of the bins have a gap of 0.05 to 0.1. Figure 10 presents the …t of the model regarding the compensation payment for the cases settled before …ling. Similar to Figure 9 , the shape is captured generally well, though …t for several bins are not very good. From  Figures 9 and 10 , the model overpredicts low compensation payment in the litigation phase, while the model overpredicts the high compensation payment for cases settled in the pre-litigation phase. Rising medical malpractice insurance premia due to excessive litigation costs have led to what many believe to be a state of crisis. According to the American Medical Association, 20 states are in a "full-blown medical liability crisis" in which doctors "retire early, relocate or give up performing high-risk medical procedures." 23 In response to these problems, medical liability reforms, such as caps on jury awards or restrictions on lawyer fees, were adopted in many states during the 1990s and are currently been considered at the federal level.
In this section, I use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual policy experiments on proposed reforms of the medical liability system. Speci…cally, I consider three policies: (1) cap of $250,000 on jury award, (2) elimination of the contingency fee rule, and (3) loser-pay-all legal cost allocation. These policies a¤ect the time to resolution and associated legal costs in a way that has important policy implications. Shorter legal procedures would save legal costs for the parties and would bene…t society by reducing congestion in the legal system. Savings of legal costs would also lower the deadweight loss of litigation because legal fee is simply a transaction cost to both parties (See, e.g. the classical work of Calabresi (1970) ). Also, the doctors would have less incentive to practice defensive medicine if medical malpractice litigations becomes less costly. It is therefore important to try to evaluate the e¤ect of these proposed policies. My approach o¤ers a systematic way of addressing these quantitative issues in the context of an equilibrium framework.
My policy experiment exercise does not intend to answer normative questions nor conduct welfare analysis on tort reform. It rather focuses on positive analysis of the e¤ect on ex-post resolution of medical malpractice claims. My model and data are not about ex-ante incentive of physician. Hence, I cannot quantify the e¤ect of tort reform on physicians'level of precaution, practice of defensive medicine, and exit of physician from market. 24 All of these factors will a¤ect the frequency and types of the claims, which welfare analysis on tort reform should incorporate. However, this policy experiment excersise is important …rst step to quantify the e¤ect of tort reform. Ex-ante incentive of physicians' behavior always depends on the payo¤s at the ex-post stage. In order to evaluate the welfare e¤ect of tort reform, changes of behavior at the ex-post stage should be identi…ed before we consider its e¤ect on ex-ante incentive of physicians. Thus, my paper provides a building block on normative questions about tort reform by developing a tool to quantify the changes at the ex-post stage.
Caps on Jury Award
The …rst policy experiment I conduct is a policy to cap the jury award at $250,000. 25 This policy obviously does not a¤ect cases whose jury award is less than $250,000 without the cap. Hence, in conducting the policy experiment, I use V 0 = minfV; 250000g
as the (unobserved) realization of the jury award instead of using the (unobserved) realization of V from F V ( ). As discussed in the model section, decrease in V enhances early settlement. The results of the experiment are presented in Table 4 . The mean time to resolution is decreased by 14.5% from 9.65 quarters to 8.25 quarters. The decrease mostly comes from the cases settled after …ling lawsuit, as observed in Figure 11 . The decision in the pre-litigation phase are not substantially a¤ected. The reduction in mean legal cost is 28.7% (from $45,959 to $32,489). The reduction of the cost is larger than that of the mean duration, because the reduction of duration is mostly in the litigation phase, which is associated with a higher per-period legal cost than in the pre-litigation phase. The mean payment also decreases by 31.7% (from $354,910 to $242,343). This immediately follows from the capping of awards. 24 See, for example, Kessler and McCllelan (1996) on the e¤ect of tort reform on defensive medicine, and Klick and Stratmann (2005) on relocation of physicians. 25 Capping of the jury award is typically on non-economic damages, which include compensation for pain and su¤ering and punitive damages whose objective is to provide punishment for the malicious or wanton misconduct of the defendant. For example, the HEALTH Act currently in the Congress considers a cap of $250,000 for non-economic damages and twice the amount of economic damages awarded or $250,000, whichever is greater, as a cap for punitive damage. 
Eliminating Contingency Fee Rule
The second policy experiment I conduct is elimination of the contingency fee rule. The contingency fee arrangement, which is employed for vast majority of the cases on injuries in the United States, makes the plainti¤'s lawyers entitled to a fraction (typically one-third to 40%) of the money received from the defendant only if a positive payment is received. The contingency fee arrangement is totally prohibited in many European countries partly because it will increase the level of litigation. The contingency fee rule allows the plainti¤ to continue the case with no direct legal costs per period. Hence, the elimination of the contingency fee, which makes the legal cost of the plainti¤ to be accrued as the case prolongs, is likely to result in earlier settlements. In conducting the policy experiment, I assumed that the plainti¤ pays per-period legal costs C pO and C pL in the pre-litigation and litigation phases, respectively. C pO and C pL are drawn from the same distribution that the defendant's per-period legal costs is drawn. Considering that the legal industry is competitive, it is natural to assume that the cost is drawn from the same distribution both for the plainti¤ and the defendant. The results of the experiment are presented in Table 5 . The mean time to resolution is decreased by 30.7% (from 9.65 quarters to 6.68 quarters). More than 45% of the cases …le immediately and settle earlier after …ling now that the plainti¤ directly incurs per-period legal cost. The reduction in mean legal cost is 16.2% from $45,959 to $38,184. The mean payment also decreases, from $354,910 to $108,884. The decrease in mean payment is due to a large fraction of cases settled with zero 
Expected
Loser-pay-all Legal Fee Allocation
The third policy experiment I conduct is the implementation of a loser-pay-all allocation of legal fees. In the United States, parties typically pay the legal cost of their lawyers regardless of the outcome of the judgment (known as the "American rule") The loser-pay-all legal fee allocation (known as the "English rule"), in contrast, prescribes that the losing party also pays the legal costs of the party prevailing at trial.
In this policy experiment, like in the previous one, I assume the legal cost on the plainti¤'s side, which is incurred by the plainti¤'s lawyer under the contingency fee rule, is drawn from the same distribution as the legal costs on the defendant's side. Since the legal cost that matters here is the cost after …ling a lawsuit, the cost to be shifted if the defendant wins is T C L . Denoting the realization of per-period cost for the plainti¤ as C P , the legal cost to be shifted if the plainti¤ win is T C P . The Figure 13 : Histogram of Payments for Cases Settled after Filing outcome of the court case is now fV; V T C P g with probability and f T C L ; 0g with probability 1 . Hence, the di¤erence in payo¤s between prevailing and losing the verdict is larger under the English rule.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 6 . The mean time to resolution increases by 10.1% (from 9.65 quarters to 10.63 quarters). Increased di¤erence in possible court outcomes prevents parties to settle early. The mean total cost increases from $45,959 to $112,114. The mean payment decreases from $354,910 to $106,360.
The intuition behind this result is following. Trade-o¤ between potential for learning new information and extra legal cost due to delay determines the equilibrium of the model. Now, the value of learning increases with loser-pay-all legal fee allocation because di¤erence in payo¤ from winning and losing judgement is increased. Hence, settlement timing delays and legal costs increase. The mean payment decreases because the number of cases settled at 0 have increased signi…cantly (see Figure 13 ). 26 Suppose that players do not settle at the last stage. In this case the continuation values at the last stage (t L + T ) are written as
Hence, the continuation value at t = t L + T 1 if players do not settle at t = t L + T is
Players do not settle i¤
Hence, if players do not settle at t = t L + T 1, they also do not settle at t = t L + T since
Following the same reasoning, players settle at t > t L i¤
Given that players settle at the subgame starting at t > t L , they always settle in any subgame starting at t 0 < t. This is because settlement at t makes V p t + V d t = 0 < C L ; which makes the players settle at t 1; which makes the player settle at t 2; and so on. Therefore, in the litigation stage game, the players either settle immediately
) or never settle and face judgment (if b
). Now, I consider the pre-litigation phase. I can follow the same reasoning as above to show that if players disagree in the …rst period, they never agree in the subsequent subgame. In such a case, the plainti¤ prefers to …le a lawsuit immediately because delaying results in more discounting on the expected award. Hence, the plainti¤ …les immediately and the case does not spend any time in the pre-litigation phase. Therefore, the players disagree in the …rst stage, as well as in any stage of the game, if (by multiplying both sides by
while a case is settled immediately if
This proves that a case is either settled immediately or judged by the court.
